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The Modern Prince as a Laboratory of Political 
Intellectuality 
 
Panagiotis Sotiris 
 
 
Introduction1 
In the history of the working-class movements, the question of 
organization, its form and functioning returns constantly.2 The very 
notions of organization and the party have been debated 
extensively and intensively and constitute one of the most 
contested terrains within Marxism, both politically and theoretically. 
One of the most important contributions has been Antonio 
Gramsci’s conceptualization of the Modern Prince in the Prison 
Notebooks, and in particular what can be described as his conception 
of organization as a laboratory of political intellectuality. In 
particular, I think that the very notion of political intellectuality 
(combined with a certain experimental conception towards which 
the analogy of the laboratory points) is at the centre of any attempt 
to actually think the question of organization and its strategic 
articulation with any hegemonic practice aiming at transformation 
and emancipation. The questions referring to organization and its 
role in the transformation of modes of thinking, in the 
confrontation with antagonistic ideologies, in the articulation of 
learning practices (including treating politics as an experimental 
configuration) in the production of knowledges, in the elaboration 
of strategies, in the enabling of the gnoseological, theoretical and 
cultural aspects of any potential subaltern hegemony, have been at 
the centre of debates around the question of organization and this 
is what makes Gramsci’s intervention so important. To bring this 
forward, it is necessary to revisit some of the debates around the 
question of organization and political intellectuality in the Marxist 
tradition, before moving to Gramsci’s elaborations in the Prison 
Notebooks and then attempting an assessment of Gramsci’s 
contribution in the light of contemporary debates around questions 
of organization. 
 
1 The writer wishes to thank the anonymous referees and Derek Boothman for their invaluable 
comments on earlier versions of this text. 
2 On recent debates see Thomas 2013. 
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1. The question of organization and political intellectuality in the history of 
Marxism 
1.1. Marx: organization as aporia 
Marx’s work does not offer a systematic reflection on the 
question of organization. Although Marx and Engels borrow the 
notion of the party from the political vocabulary of their era, texts 
such as the Communist Manifesto do not actually offer a theory for a 
working-class party. Rather, they presented communists as the most 
radical wing of the working-class organizations of that time. 
 
The Communists do not form a separate party opposed to other working-
class parties. [...] 
The Communists, therefore, are on the one hand, practically, the most 
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, 
that section which pushes forward all others. (MECW, vol. 6, p. 497). 
 
Even the “Address of the Central Authority of the League” to its 
members, written in March 1850, which insisted that the class 
interests of the proletariat demanded “an independent party as soon 
as possible” which will not be “misled for a single moment by the 
hypocritical phrases of the democratic petty bourgeois” and whose 
“battle cry must be: The Revolution in Permanence” (MECW, vol. 
10, 287) does not make more concrete proposals upon how this 
“independent political party of the proletariat” should be organised. 
We should take into consideration the fact that the working-class 
movements and the revolutionary tendencies of that time 
represented a galaxy of different and fragmented collective forms 
that included journals, small groups of intellectuals and workers, 
utopian experiments, small organizations, and personal circles. 
Even the International Working Men’s Association, was less an 
“International” and more a network that brought together 
organizations, representatives of trade unions and important 
personalities, from a very broad spectrum of ideological currents, 
most of them at that time more influential than the positions of 
Marx and Engels. As Monty Johnstone has suggested these 
included: 
 
(a) the small international Communist cadres’ organization (the League of 
Communists – 1847-52); (b) the ‘party’ without an organization (during the ebb 
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of the labour movement – 1850s and early ’60s); (c) the broad international 
federation of workers’ organizations (the First International – 1864-72); (d) the 
Marxist national mass party (German Social Democracy – 1870s, ’80s and early 
’90s); (e) the broad national labour party (Britain and America—1880s and 
early ’90s) based on the Chartist model. (Johnstone 1967, p. 122). 
 
Moreover, both Marx and Engels found themselves in the 
middle of a tension between two important currents of their time. 
On the one hand, there was the current of State Socialism 
represented by Lassalle, the current which at the same time was one 
of the first to insist upon the need to form a national labour party, 
and which was one of the constituent tendencies of German social-
democracy. On the other hand, there was the anarchist current, in 
the particular version represented by Bakunin, where anti-statism 
was combined with a certain conception of the small conspiratorial 
group, 3  a position that was influential in many countries. Both 
currents had a massive following and this was evident in the 
continuous influence of Lassalle’s line in the German working-class 
movement, long after his death, and of course in the clash between 
Marx and Bakunin the Hague Congress. These currents represented 
positions which Marx and Engels felt obliged to struggle against 
(since it was obvious that they opposed both the logic of a state- 
centred socialist policy and with the practice of the small 
conspiratorial group) and at the same time to recognize as actually 
existing currents within the working class movement.4 It is as if 
such positions represented real currents and aspects of the reality of 
the working class movement. Regarding this point Étienne Balibar 
made an important observation: 
 
Let us mention only one example: the triangle formed by Marx, Lassalle, 
and Bakunin. In my opinion, one does not wonder enough about the fact that 
such indefatigable polemicists such as Marx and his faithful assistant Engels 
turned out to be incapable of writing an “Anti-Lassalle” or an “Anti-Bakunin,” 
which would have been practically much more important than an Anti-Dühring 
or even than the reissue of an Anti-Proudhon. No personal and no tactical 
reason in the world will ever be able to explain such a lapse, a lapse which 
moreover was, as we know, heavy with political consequences. They did not write 
it because they could not write it (Balibar 1994, p. 134). 
 
3 A view also held by Blanquists. See Green 2017. 
4 For a detailed account of the evolution of the other currents of the working class movement 
and Marx and Engel’s confrontation with them see Draper 1990. See also Johnstone 1967. 
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In this sense, we can say that the question of organization 
remained an aporia for Marx and Engels in particular around the 
question of the form of a proletarian party, its internal functioning 
and above all the way that theory, knowledge and strategy could be 
produced in an antagonistic and class autonomous way. 
It was the formation of German social-democracy with the SPD 
becoming the model party, in particular after the 1891 Erfurt 
Congress, that gave the first example of a really mass working class 
party. At the beginning of the 20th century, it was the most impress-
ive example of a mass party in Europe. It was a party that was not 
simply involved in massive campaigns of political propaganda and 
organization building but also gradually created a “parallel universe” 
of working class newspapers, organizations, trade unions, clubs, 
mutual assistance organizations, schools, while at the same time 
insisting on its role as guarantor of Marxist “orthodoxy”, even after 
the appearance of the Bernstein’s “revisionist” positions.5 However, 
the overall experience and evolution of German social-democracy 
also made evident its limitations and its inability to initiate a 
revolutionary sequence. 
Moreover, although an educational role and an insistence on 
mass ideological transformation was one of the main concerns, 
German Social-Democracy failed to offer an answer to the 
question: in what sense does the political organization produce 
antagonistic and autonomous forms of political intellectuality and 
strategy, by means and practices that are linked in an “organic” way 
to the subaltern classes themselves and their aspirations? Thus the 
question of a particular form and practice of antagonistic political 
intellectuality remained open.  
 
1.2 What is to be done? as a text of political gnoseology 
Few texts in the history of Marxism have come under as much 
accusation as Lenin’s What is to be done?. It is common to reject it as 
 
5  On the ‘Erfurtian’ model of the mass Social-democratic party and its appeal in the 
international working class movement see Lih 2008. As Broué mentions (2006, pp. 14-15) in 
1914 the SPD had 1,085,905 members, in the elections held two years before it had won 
4,250,000 votes, the trade unions associated with the SPD had 2 million members, it had 90 
daily newspaper, employed 267 full time journalists, 3,000 workers and employees to print and 
distribute them, it had 110 Reichstag deputies and 220 deputies in local parliaments, 2,886 
municipal councilors and many professional cadres. 
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a text that simply insists upon a certain – and by now parochial – 
conception of a small conspiratorial group based upon the idea that 
socialist consciousness has to be brought to workers from the 
outside. However, this approach simply misses the importance of 
this text. Lars T. Lih (2008) has stressed, in his magisterial 
comparative reading of What is to be done?, the influence of German 
Social-Democracy and the “Erfurtian” model upon Lenin, but I 
think that this approach underestimates the originality of Lenin’s 
positions. In contrast, Lucio Magri stressed that Lenin actually tried 
to answer some of the open questions in Marx’s writings on 
questions of organization. 
 
However, one aspect of the theory of the proletarian party, and by no 
means a secondary one, was never fully clarified by Marx. Confined to the 
immediacy of prevailing conditions, the proletariat cannot achieve a complete 
vision of the social system as a whole, nor promote its overthrow. Its practice 
as a class can only develop by transcending this immediacy via the mediation of 
revolutionary consciousness. What then is the process, the mechanism by 
which this consciousness is produced? Or, to pose the question more precisely: 
can this class consciousness develop within the proletariat spontaneously, by 
virtue of an intrinsic necessity, based on elements that are already present in its 
social objectivity and which gradually come to dominate over the other 
elements that originally condemned it to a subordinate and fragmented 
condition? Or must revolutionary consciousness represent a global 
transcendence of the immediacy of the proletariat, produced by a qualitative 
dialectical leap – a complex interaction between external forces and the 
spontaneous action of the class itself? (Magri, 1970: 101). 
 
The central issue of What is to be done? is a question of political 
gnoseology in regard to the possibility of a revolutionary 
consciousness as a form of consciousness that transcends the 
immediacy of the everyday condition of labour and opens up 
towards an understanding of the overall working of the social 
system in order to rethink the possibility of a political movement 
for revolutionary change. Lenin’s position is organized not only 
around the acknowledgement of the influence of dominant 
ideology upon the spontaneous ideology of the masses, but also 
around the insistence that any attempt to enable the formation of a 
revolutionary consciousness should be intensified along with the 
spontaneous militancy of the masses. 
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[T]he fundamental error committed by the “new trend” in Russian Social-
Democracy is its bowing to spontaneity and its failure to understand that the 
spontaneity of the masses demands a high degree of consciousness from us 
Social-Democrats. The greater the spontaneous upsurge of the masses and the 
more widespread the movement, the more rapid, incomparably so, the demand 
for greater consciousness in the theoretical, political and organizational work 
of Social-Democracy (LCW, vol. 5, p. 397) 
 
So the crucial question is how to produce this particular form of 
consciousness within the terrain of class struggles, but in a way that 
goes beyond simply reproducing the spontaneous proletarian 
ideological representations. Although Lenin insists that revolution-
ary consciousness is not inherent to the working class in its every-
day practice, the formation of such consciousness is not external to 
the terrain of social and political antagonism, but internal to class 
struggle and it refers more to qualitative transformation rather than 
“injection” from the outside. Moreover, it is here that the party is 
treated not as the “guarantor” of revolutionary truth, but rather as 
the production site for an antagonistic form of intellectuality. And 
as Sylvain Lazarus has stressed it is here that we find the actual 
tension between Marx and Lenin.  
 
The tension lies rather in the fact that, for Marx, the appearance of 
Communists is something internal to the existence of the workers as a class. 
Lenin distances himself from this thesis by his critique of what he calls 
spontaneous consciousness. Revolutionary consciousness, the appearance of 
revolutionary militants, is not a spontaneous phenomenon. It is a very 
particular phenomenon, and it requires a break with spontaneous forms of 
consciousness. The political core of nonspontaneous consciousness is 
antagonism to the entire existing social and political order. As for the 
mechanism of realization of the conditions that will permit the emergence of a 
political consciousness, it is the party (Lazarus, 2007: 259). 
 
Moreover, Lazarus insists that in Marx we cannot find a theory 
of political consciousness. We can find a theory of history as history 
of class struggles and a theory of historical consciousness but not a 
theory of political consciousness. For Lazarus it is Lenin that 
inaugurates the confrontation with this question. 
 
With Marx, in fact, there is no theory of organization, nor can we speak of a 
real theory of political consciousness. There is a theory, major and fundament-
al, of historical consciousness and of consciousness as historical consciousness 
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– the history of humanity is the history of class struggles. I hold that Lenin 
brings the foundation of modern politics in the fact that revolutionary politics 
is required to announce and practice the conditions of its existence (Lazarus, 
2007: 259). 
On his part Antonio Negri in the reading he offers of Lenin, a 
reading influenced by the idiosyncratic Leninism of Italian operaismo, 
stresses the link between the particular condition of the Russian 
proletariat and the way the Lenin thinks the very question of 
organization, suggesting that Lenin thinks the political party as a 
factory of strategy. 
 
The party, too, must be able to organize and form the multiplicative 
character of revolutionary labour, exalting and subverting against capital the 
very thing that it determines as a growth of the productive power of socialized 
labour. The party is a factory; it is an enterprise of subversion, an ability to 
impose a multiplier of productive rationality onto the revolutionary will of 
militants and the spontaneity of the masses. The party turns this primary 
matter, which is workers’ insubordination, into the accumulation of revolution, 
into a generic power to attack the adversary (Negri, 2014: 36). 
 
It is true that any attempt to present a unified “Leninist theory of 
the party” would only lead to simplifications, anachronisms and the 
reproductions of later canonizations. Most of Lenin’s texts were 
interventions in the conjuncture, they answered to exigencies in 
relation to very specific times and places, are over-determined by 
the particular conditions and the history of the Russian working-
class movement and often deal with tactics rather than strategy. 
However, we can note at least three important elements. 
The first one has to do with the connection between party and 
strategy. The party represents the strong connection to revolution-
ary strategy, not as something referring to the distant future but as 
constant elaboration of the ways to connect immediate political 
exigencies and the ability to develop a form of revolutionary 
consciousness and practice that would enable the working class to 
be the leading force of all the subaltern classes. 
The second element is what we could define as class autonomy. 
The demand for an independent political organization of the 
working class, as expression of its class antagonistic character, runs 
through the entire history of the working-class movement, ever 
since the Communist Manifesto. However, it is in Lenin’s texts that we 
find this demand not only as an organizational aspect (this was 
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already evident in German Social-Democracy), but as a strategic 
line that runs through all practices and interventions. For Lenin the 
proletarian character of the party is not a question of class 
composition of the membership or of the electorate but rather a 
question of political strategy and strategic independence in regard 
to dominant ideology.  
And this brings to the third crucial element, that of the need for 
a radical rupture. If class autonomy is above all a question of 
political strategic orientation, then the organizational break with the 
political forms of the working-class movement that represent the 
influence of bourgeois politics and ideology becomes the necessary 
condition of its revolutionary character. Lenin made this evident by 
his insistence that this should also take a symbolic form on the eve 
of the revolution by means of the choice of a new name (“com-
munist”) and the formation of a new International 
  
9) Party tasks: 
(a) Immediate convocation of a Party congress; 
(b) Alteration of the Party Programme, mainly: 
(1) On the question of imperialism and the imperialist war; 
(2) On our attitude towards the state and our demand for a “commune 
state”; 
(3) Amendment of our out-of-date minimum programme; 
(c) Change of the Party’s name. 
10) A new International (LCW, vol. 24, p. 24) 
 
For Lenin the class character of a party has more to do with 
strategy rather than sociology. The stake is to ensure that the largest 
part of the working class will recognize itself in the political current 
that represents the possibility of proletarian revolution. A careful 
reading of Lenin’s texts immediately before and immediately after 
October 1917 shows how his main concern and at the same time 
the element he thinks is an expression of the “ripening of condi-
tions”, is the extent of the influence of the Bolsheviks in the 
Russian working class. 
However, there is also a tension in his intervention. On the one 
hand Lenin quickly incorporated the Soviets in his conception of 
revolutionary politics, acknowledging that they represented a 
practice of politics and a form of power that was antagonistic to the 
bourgeois practice of politics. This is expressed in his conception of 
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dual power, his insistence that the Soviets were going to be the 
forms of the State under the dictatorship of the proletariat. We also 
know that, in a manner similar to that of Marx in regard to the Paris 
Commune, Lenin incorporated into his conception a form of auto-
nomous class organization that emerged within class struggle itself 
and was not initially a choice of the Bolshevik current (Shandro 
2007). We also know that even after the revolution Lenin was 
thinking in terms of a certain relation of autonomy between the 
Soviets and the parties of currents that participated in them in the 
struggle for hegemony. It would be through the experience of the 
Civil War and later in the Stalinist era that the idea of the single 
party system and the full identification between the proletarian 
party and the supposedly proletarian State would become the 
orthodoxy along with the abandonment of the Soviet model in 
favour of the single-party State parliamentarism of the “People’s 
democracies”. 
Of course, one might say that some of Lenin’s interventions, 
especially those specific to the confrontation between the 
Bolsheviks and other currents, such as the particularly centralizing 
conception of the Central Committee as the main decision body in 
contrast to local organizations, can indeed to a bureaucratic 
conception if taken out of context and applied as general rules. In 
this sense, some of the more critical observations by Rosa 
Luxemburg in her critique of Lenin on questions of organization 
were valid and in particular her position that there were no 
organizational guarantees against opportunism (Luxemburg 1961). 
At the same time, although Lenin insisted on the relation between 
party, theory and revolutionary consciousness as the means to turn 
the organization into the production process of strategic initiatives, 
the particular way that this should be accomplished and in 
particular the question of the elaboration of an antagonistic political 
intellectuality still remained open. 
 
1.3 Georg Lukács: The question of organization as an intellectual question 
One of the most important theoretical interventions in the 
period after the Russian Revolution was Georg Lukács’s History and 
Class Consciousness. And it is here that the question of political 
intellectuality is posed in an explicit way in the last essay of the 
book, which deals with the question of organization (“Towards a 
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Methodology of the Problem of Organization”).6 For Lukács the 
contradictory views that different tendencies of the working class 
movement had in regard to the Russian Revolution and the 
persisting influence of “Menshevik” currents provided evidence of 
an ideological crisis of the proletariat and an inability to think on 
the basis of its own class perspective, as a result of the divisions 
running through the proletariat but also of the effects that the 
capitalist division of labour had upon the consciousness of the 
proletariat. If political organization can be defined as the “form of 
mediation between theory and practice” (Lukács 1971, p. 299), the 
crucial question is to what extent actual communist organizations 
perform this mediation. Moreover, the necessary independence of 
the communist parties (exemplified in the break with social 
democratic parties) should not be seen as the formation of a 
“General Staff” detached from the working class but a “new 
relation between spontaneous action and conscious theoretical 
foresight” (Lukács 1971, p. 317), which demanded the participation 
of members in all aspects of organizational life, in order to bring 
forward the proletarian worldview and struggle against all the 
inherited influences of bourgeois “reified” consciousness. When 
Lukács opposed the idea that the party “consists merely of a 
hierarchy of officials isolated from the mass of ordinary members” 
(Lukács 1971, p. 336), this was not only in order to avoid the 
reproduction of bourgeois politics but also it was a necessary 
condition for the party to perform this particular unity of theory 
and practice which would represent the proletarian worldview in 
the struggle for communism. 
In Lukács’s analysis there are no simple organizational or 
“military” metaphors of the party as leadership or “general head-
quarters”. Rather the party and the organization are presented as 
spaces of collective thinking, practice and transformation. We can 
see the same concerns in other texts by Lukács of that period 
(Lukács 2014), in which he deals with two crucial questions, one 
referring to tactics (the debate in the German communist 
movement regarding the “Teilactionen”) and the other referring to 
the party (“mass party or sect”). Lukács insists that the question 
 
6 On the importance of this text and of Lukács’s thinking on questions of organization in 
general see Thomas 2013. 
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cannot be answered by means of bureaucratic centralization, but by 
enhancing the full development of the consciousness of members. 
That is why for Lukács ‘the question of organization reveals itself to 
be an intellectual [geistig] question’ (Lukács 2014, p. 116).  
It is obvious that for Lukács the question of political intellectuality 
becomes one of the determining aspects of any potential revol-
utionary politics, and consequently of the organizational form of 
any such politics, in a manner very similar to how Gramsci would 
later face again the challenge of this question, and on a similar basis 
with Lukács, namely the open questions and contradictions of the 
period after 1917. 
 
1.4. Can politics be thought? 
Before moving into Antonio Gramsci’s writings on questions of 
organization, I would like to turn to some more recent inter-
ventions. This detour (and slight anachronism) will help me show 
how Gramsci’s thinking is not only pertinent to these debates, but 
also offers a way out of crucial aporias regarding contemporary 
interventions.  
If we speak about the party of an independent expression of the 
revolutionary dynamic of the working class, or about Lenin’s 
conception of the party as the way to enhance the revolutionary 
consciousness of the proletariat, or about the questions posed by 
Lukács, it is obvious that there is a recurring question regarding the 
connection between (revolutionary) politics and thinking, it is the 
question whether politics can be thought. 
 This has been a question running through the work of Alain 
Badiou. Can politics be thought? was even the title of one of Badiou’s 
important interventions in the 1980s (Badiou 2018). In his reading 
of Sylvain Lazarus’s Anthropology of the Name (Lazarus 2015) Badiou 
suggests that it is possible to find in Lazarus’s work a distinct form 
of intellectuality in regard to politics, a distinct “configuration of 
intellectuality [dispositif d’ intellectualité]” (Badiou 2005, p. 27, 
translation modified). 
“People think” and “politics as thought”: Both Lazarus and 
Badiou oppose these two theses to any classical conception of 
theory in its relation to social reality and its potential transform-
ation, including any conception of a dialectic of theory and practice. 
In contrast, for Badiou “[t]hought is not a relation to the object, it is 
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an internal relation of its Real” (Badiou 2005, p. 28) and the local-
ization of a political singularity. 
 
Politics is a thought. This statement excludes all recourse to the theory / 
practice pairing. There is certainly a ‘doing’ of politics, but it is immediately the 
pure and simple experience of a thought, its localization. Doing politics cannot 
be distinguished from thinking politics (Badiou 2005, p. 46). 
 
In the line of reasoning presented by Lazarus and Badiou, the 
emphasis is always on the singularity of thought and the singularity 
of revolutionary sequence. In a certain sense, politics and thinking, 
thinking politics and doing revolutionary politics are part of the 
same self-constituting process, which unites the subjective con-
dition and the fact that people now think under the event, under 
the new terrain opened by the opening of a singular revolutionary 
sequence. For Badiou this is exemplified in Lazarus’s insistence that 
“the possible is a category in subjectivity” and that “the prescriptive 
possible is thus the content of subjectivities and practices that 
presided over what has taken place” (Lazarus 2015, p. 160). For 
Badiou, 
 
[t]his clarifies why one is able to think the singularity of a thought within a 
strictly prescriptive and self-constituting realm of interiority, both rationally 
(through the category of the name and places of the name), and without having 
to immerse it in the heterogeneity of time: what has taken place is thinkable, 
both as a precarious singularity restricted by dates […] and as indifferent to 
time. To think a singularity does indeed determine it, in the words of 
Thucydides, in the guise of an ‘eternal acquisition’ (Badiou 2005, p. 38). 
 
The notion of interiority is crucial in this conception of the 
intellectuality of politics. For Lazarus interiority suggests that it is a 
politics based in subjectivity and in relation to a singular sequence. 
“Politics in interiority is a politics in subjectivity” (Lazarus 2016, p. 
110). It is also a politics of singularity and of producing new ways 
to do politics and new ways of organization. 
 
Politics in interiority, in its assignment to the principle people think, produces 
a politics in subjectivity. In its assignment to historicity, it is what makes it 
possible to grasp the way in which politics exists, when it does exist, as relation 
of a politics to its thought: this is the theory of politics’ historical mode. The category 
of politics’ historical mode is what makes it possible to apprehend a politics in 
the singular invention that it presents, the equally singular practices that it 
deploys, its hitherto unseen forms of organization (Lazarus 2016, p. 112). 
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However, how can we define this form of intellectuality 
associated with new forms of politics and organization aiming at 
social emancipation and transformation? Although Lazarus and 
Badiou offer some lines of demarcation such as the insistence upon 
the need for a politics at a distance from the State, the insistence on 
the break with parliamentary logic and the fidelity to the communist 
idea, yet the question of organization remains open. Moreover, one 
can say that especially Badiou seems to reject any attempt to think 
the question of political intellectuality as also an organizational 
question. 
This lack of a particular reference to the question of organization 
as a space and process producing militant intellectualities, can also 
be related to Badiou’s critique of what he has defined as a demo-
cratic materialism and a certain form of democracy. Bruno Bosteels 
has suggested that this has to do with Badiou’s critical position 
against a certain postmodern conception of radical democracy 
“paradoxically anchored in the essential unfulfillment of both 
subject and object as the founding poles of modernity” (Bosteels 
2011, p. 252), in the sense of a radical lack at the centre of social 
non-ontology. “Grounded in the inherent lack of the field of the 
political, radical democracy always seeks to avoid the imminent 
threat of totalitarianism that lies at the core of democracy itself” 
(Bosteels 2011, p. 261). In contrast to this, according to Bosteels 
Badiou aims to “to think the actuality of the present and to histori-
cize the processes of subjectivization” (Bosteels 2011, p. 261), by 
means of a politics based upon the communist hypothesis. 
However, by delinking the question of the fidelity to the 
communist hypothesis from any considerations regarding questions 
of organization, political experimentation and revolutionary prac-
tice, Badiou in the end oscillates between a militant decisionism and 
an almost Platonic dogmatism. This is one of the limits of his 
conceptualization of politics. 
In contrast, Jacques Rancière “bends the stick to the other side” 
in his egalitarian conception of the intelligence of everybody as a 
prerequisite of emancipation: 
 
Instead it is the intelligence that does not fit any specific position in a social 
order but belongs to anybody as the intelligence of anybody. Emancipation 
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then means: the appropriation of this intelligence which is one, and the 
verification of the potential of the equality of intelligence (Rancière 2010, p. 
168). 
 
For Rancière the answer to this is a communism of the 
intelligence: 
 
Emancipation means the communism of intelligence, enacted in the 
demonstration of the capacity of the ‘incapable’: the capacity of the ignorant to 
learn by himself, says Jacotot. We can add: the capacity of the worker to let his 
eyes and his mind escape from the work of his hands, the capacity of a 
community of workers to stop work even though it does not wait and even 
though they need it for their livelihoods, to transform the private space of the 
workshop into a public space, to organize production by their own forces or to 
take on the task of governing a city that its rulers have deserted or betrayed 
(Rancière 2010, p. 168). 
 
This is a fascinating position and in a certain sense it has the 
extra advantage in comparison to Badiou’s position that it does not 
limit thinking to the conjuncture of a potentially revolutionary 
sequence. However, there are some open questions. Although 
Rancière stresses the political and intellectual potential of the 
subaltern social groups, he underestimates the need for any ant-
agonistic political intellectuality, both as theory/knowledge and 
strategy, to be produced, elaborated, articulated and not just taken 
give. Although a useful reminder that the subaltern can actually 
think, in contrast to any doctrinaire and elitist conception of 
politics, this position refuses to see the importance of the organ-
izational forms and political practices that enhance this “commun-
ism of intelligence’” and turn into into a political strategy and 
emancipatory process. 
Moreover, there is another important point. It is not only that 
the people think. The State also thinks, in the sense of producing 
discourses, knowledges and subjectivities. Although this is a 
position we tend to attribute to Foucault and his conception of the 
State producing discourses and truth regimes, I would like to turn 
our attention to Poulantzas and how he encapsulated this question 
in State Power and Socialism 
 
This presupposes that, in the various codes of thinking, the state itself is 
overcoded: that it serves as the frame of reference within which the various 
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segments of reasoning and their supporting apparatuses find homogenous 
ground for their differential functioning. Through a process of measured 
distillation, this overcoding is inculcated in the totality of subjects. Thus, the 
capitalist State installs a uniform national language and eliminated all other 
languages. [...] It is therefore the mission of the national State to organize the 
process of thought by forging the materiality of the people-nation, and to 
create a language which while doubtless situated within ideological formations, 
is by no means reducible to an ideological operation. (Poulantzas 2000, p. 58). 
 
So the question is how we counter this collective and material-
ized knowledge and intelligence, this over-coding produced by the 
State. And the question becomes even more important if we 
consider the fact that the people or the subaltern are neither outside 
the State nor immune to its ideological and intellectual functioning 
(something also underestimated by the way Rancière takes this 
communism of intelligence as given). What are the collective 
practices and forms, what are the forms of organization that can 
actually help people think politics and think a politics of emanci-
pation and can induce the emergence of forms of intellectuality that 
maintain and expand the constitutive interiority to the possibility of 
a revolutionary sequence? It is obvious that these are open 
questions in the entire history of the working-class movements and 
their political forms. To try and answer these questions we must 
turn to Antonio Gramsci. 
 
 
2. Gramsci and the challenge of mass political intellectuality 
2.1 Gramsci’s confrontation with questions of organization 
Gramsci’s thinking on questions of organization cannot be 
separated from his conceptualization of the integral State and his 
theory of hegemony, and is part of his broader confrontation with 
the question of how to rearticulate a revolutionary strategy in a 
period of defeat of the revolution. As I will try to show, all these 
can explain his particular emphasis on the question of organization 
of a mass political intellectuality as a necessary condition of the 
potential conquest of hegemony by the subaltern classes.  
Gramsci’s thinking on questions of organization was also 
conditioned by his own experiences of political militancy: his 
participation in the formation of an independent communist party 
oscillating between sectarianism – in the particular version 
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represented by Bordiga – and the emerging line of the United 
Front, which would also be the background of Gramsci’s last 
interventions before his imprisonment; his experience and 
participation in a unique experiment of autonomous class 
organization, the worker’s councils, would be a constant reference 
point as a case study of proletarian self-government; his first hand 
experience of the Communist International in a period when there 
was still open discussion and confrontation between different 
opinions before the advent of a supposed “monolithic” functioning. 
Of all these experiences it is important to stress the formative 
character of Gramsci’s involvement in the factory council move-
ment in Turin and in the publication of Ordine Nuovo (d’Orsi 2017, 
pp. 98-131). The factory council movement presented for him an 
example of an emerging workers’ democracy: “The socialist State 
already exists potentially in the institutions of social life character-
istic of the exploited working class” (Gramsci 1977, p. 65). At the 
same time this experience made him confront the complex question 
of the relation between spontaneous movements and organized 
political forms, something evident in the tension in his writings at 
that time regarding the roles of the party and the councils 
(Silvestrini 2017). 
The importance of the factory council / Ordine Nuovo experience 
is also evident in Q3§48, a note written between October and 
November 1930. The reference in the title of the note to spontaneity 
and conscious leadership sets the tone of the note. For Gramsci “‘pure’ 
spontaneity does not exist in history” (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p. 
328; PN Vol. 2, p. 48) and elements of conscious leadership are 
always active in movements of the subaltern classes, “but none of 
them predominates or goes beyond the level of ‘popular science’ –
‘common sense,’ that is the [traditional] conception of the world – 
of a given social stratum” (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p. 328; PN Vol. 
2, p. 49). Gramsci defends the Turin movement against accusations 
that it was sponteneist or voluntarist and defends “the creativity 
and soundness of the leadership that the movement acquired”. And 
this is how Gramsci describes this creativity and soundness: 
 
This was not an “abstract” leadership; it did not consist in the mechanical 
repetition of scientific or theoretical formulas; it did not confuse politics – real 
action – with theoretical disquisition. It devoted itself to real people in specific 
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historical relations, with specific sentiments, ways of life, fragments of 
worldviews, etc., that were outcomes of the “spontaneous” combinations of a 
given environment of material production with the “fortuitous” gathering of 
disparate social elements within that same environent.  The element of 
“spontaneity” was not neglected, much less disdained: it was educated, it was 
given a direction, it was cleansed of everything extraneous that could 
contaminate it, in order to unify it by means of modern theory but in a living 
historical manner (Gramsci 1975, Q3§48, p. 330; PN Vol. 2, p. 50) 
 
Gramsci here points to a complex conception of leadership as a 
transformative process, where the “spontaneous” elements in the 
resistances and aspirations of the subaltern classes are transformed 
into a conscious political practice by means of a “pedagogical” 
intervention that brings along theoretical elements not in order to 
replace the spontaneous elements but to unify them. Consequently, 
“[t]he unity of ‘spontaneity’ and ‘conscious leadership,’ or ‘disci-
pline,’ is precisely the real political action of the subaltern classes” 
(Gramsci 1975, 3§48, p. 330; PN Vol. 2, p. 51). This makes evident 
that Gramsci not only always had a reference to the experience of 
the factory councils movement, but also that his conception of 
political “leadership” also included this articulation and reciprocal 
relation between the “party form” and the collective practices and 
ingenuity of the subaltern masses in struggle, especially when such 
forms of self-organization emerged.  
Lukács also dealt with the same question in his 1968 Process of 
democratisation when he stressed that “seemingly overpowering mass 
spontaneity was even expanded, consolidated and directed toward 
concrete goals through the organizational work of the council 
movement [Rätebewegung]. Originating in the Commune of 1871, 
spontaneously cropping up anew in 1905, the council movement 
became the paradigmatic model of socialist democracy in and after 
1917” (Lukács 1991, p. 125; translation modified). However, it is 
interesting that in this intervention, Lukács insisted on the 
impossibility of repeating the experience of the councils and 
stressed instead the role of the party in regard to the task of 
democratizing socialism: “the present, extremely widespread apathy 
of the laboring masses can only develop itself to such socialist 
democratic activity through goals provided it by an outside force”. 
For Lukács it was the Communist Party that should take up the task 
“of mobilization, of taking the currently private, intersubjective, and 
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subterranean movements and organizing them in practical life as 
emancipator, as goal-oriented behavior” (Lukács 1991, p. 162).  
Returning to Gramsci, in a note on Machiavelli, originally in 
Notebook 8 and then in a second draft in Notebook 13, he encap-
sulates the necessity of the political party, in opposition to other 
forms of organization exactly on the basis of a need not only to 
form a collective will but also to enable it to articulate and execute a 
political project. Here the opposition is to Sorel, who is accused by 
Gramsci that, by remaining confined to the conception of the 
“myth” (the ideological and political imagery that would inspire the 
masses), he also remains within the limits of the trade union and the 
general strike, without being able to think either the notion of the 
party or a more general project of political transformation. 
 
A study might be made of how it came about that Sorel never advanced 
from his conception of ideology-as-myth to an understanding of the political 
party, but stopped short at the idea of the trade union. It is true that for Sorel 
the “myth” found its fullest expression not in the trade union as organisation 
of a collective will, but in its practical action – sign of a collective will already 
operative. The highest achievement of this practical action was to have been 
the general strike – i.e. a “passive activity”, so to speak, of a negative and 
preliminary kind (it could only be given a positive character by the realization 
of a common accord between the various wills involved), an activity which 
does not envisage an “active and constructive” phase of its own (Gramsci 
1975, Q13§1, pp. 1556-57; SPN, p. 127). 
 
It is upon this basis that Gramsci can suggest the analogy 
between Machiavelli’s Prince, namely the way that the Florentine 
thinker sought the person that could function as the catalyst for a 
process of national unification of the fragmented Italian space, and 
the modern political party. The aim was to suggest that the 
communist party (but also the United Front) should also function 
in this unifying way, articulating the fragmented and “molecular” 
practices and aspirations of the subaltern in a common political 
demand for radical transformation. 
 
The modern prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete 
individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a 
collective will, which has already been recognized and has to some extent 
asserted itself in action, begins to take concrete form. History has already 
provided this organism, and it is the political party – the first cell in which 
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there come together germs of a collective will tending to become universal and 
total (Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p. 1558; SPN, p. 129). 
 
This drawing of a line of demarcation from Sorel is also in fact 
Gramsci’s way to transcend a politics of simply investing upon the 
spontaneous political forms emerging in the class struggle. 
However, transcending does not mean denying or rejecting. Rather 
it means acknowledging limits and confronting the challenge of a 
politics referring to political level per se. This can account for the 
positive account of Jacobinism as a reference point for the Modern 
Prince, with Jacobinism becoming a synonym for a politics aiming 
at the formation of a collective will for hegemony. 
 
The abstract character of the Sorelian conception of the myth is manifest in 
its aversion (which takes the emotional form of an ethical repugnance) for the 
Jacobins, who were certainly a “categorical embodiment” of Machiavelli's 
Prince. The Modern Prince must have a part devoted to Jacobinism (in the 
integral sense which this notion has had historically, and must have concept-
ually), as an exemplification of the concrete formation and operation of a 
collective will which at least in some aspects was an original, ex novo creation. 
And a definition must be given of collective will, and of political will in general, 
in the modem sense: will as operative awareness of historical necessity, as 
protagonist of a real and effective historical drama (Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p. 
1559; SPN, p. 130). 
 
Consequently, for Gramsci the Modern Prince is a way to think 
the political operation of the revolutionary party (and also the 
United Front as the principal form of doing mass politics), treating 
it as the terrain par excellence for the elaboration of a collective will 
capable of being the protagonist of a process of social transform-
ation. That is why the duties of the Modern Prince also include 
another crucial Gramscian notion: “intellectual and moral reform”. 
This notion points to the way in which Gramsci considers both 
historical materialism and the communist perspective to refer to the 
universal transformation of all instances of social existence. 
 
The Modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and 
organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating the 
terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular collective will 
towards the realization of a superior, total form of modern civilization. 
(Gramsci 1975, Q13§1, p. 1560; SPN, pp. 132-3). 
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This is indeed a very important and very dense passage from 
Gramsci, since it both incorporates and at the same time transcends 
the “Jacobin” notion of the collective will, with the inclusion of a 
defining aspect of subalternity in the notion of “national-popular”, 
connecting it to the communist perspective (hence the reference to 
a superior and total form of modern civilization) and insisting that 
the terrain for the elaboration for such a political practice is indeed 
the Modern Prince. 
 
2.2. Mass intellectuality and common sense 
What is also particularly important is how Gramsci has a fairly 
broad conception of the intellectual aspect of all social practice:  
There is no human activity from which every form of intellectual 
participation can be excluded: Homo faber cannot be separated from homo 
sapiens. [. . .] The problem of creating a new stratum of intellectuals consists 
therefore in the critical elaboration of the intellectual activity that exists in 
everyone … (Gramsci 1975, Q12§3, pp. 1550-51; SPN, p. 9). 
 
This broad definition of intellectuality is a very crucial node in 
Gramsci’s attempt to link the possibility of a subaltern hegemony 
with the form of intellectuality inherent to the practices of the 
subaltern classes. This need to find the elements of intellectuality 
that exist in the practices of the subaltern in order to transform 
them as part of a politics for hegemony, is also evident in his 
approach to the notion of the common sense [senso comune]. 
 
Every social stratum has its own ‘common sense’ and its own ‘good sense’, 
which are basically the most widespread conception of life and of man. Every 
philosophical current leaves behind a sedimentation of ‘common sense’: this is 
the document of its historical effectiveness. Common sense is not something 
rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming itself, enriching itself with 
scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have entered ordinary 
life. ‘Common sense’ is the folklore of philosophy, and is always half-way 
between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and 
economics of the specialists. Common sense creates the folklore of the future, 
that is as a relatively rigid phase of popular knowledge at a given place and 
time. (Gramsci 1975, Q24§4, p. 2271; SPN, p. 326, footnote 5). 
 
What is important in this conception is that this is not just a 
relation of transforming common sense into “good sense”, which 
would suggest a traditional “pedagogical” conception of politics as 
“political education”. One way to think these questions is by 
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turning to Gramsci’s conception of hegemony as a pedagogical 
practice and relation. This is exemplified in the following well- 
known passage from Q10II§44): 
 
This problem can and must be related to the modern way of considering 
pedagogical doctrine and practice, according to which the relationship between 
teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil 
and every pupil a teacher. [...] This form of relationship exists throughout 
society as a whole and for every individual relative to other individuals. It exists 
between intellectual and non-intellectual sections of the population, between 
the rulers and the ruled, elites and their followers, leaders [dirigenti] and led, 
the vanguard and the body of the army. Every relationship of “hegemony” is 
necessarily an educational relationship and occurs not only within a nation, 
between the various forces of which the nation is composed, but in the inter-
national and world-wide field, between complexes of national and continental 
civilisations (Gramsci 1975, Q10II§44, p. 1331; SPN, pp. 349-50). 
 
Pedagogy in Gramsci has a specific signification and there is 
always a dialogue with Marx’s third Thesis on Feuerbach, the thesis that 
articulates a dialectical pedagogical relation based upon the premise 
that the educator must also be educated with revolutionary praxis: 
 
The materialist doctrine concerning the changing of circumstances and 
upbringing forgets that circumstances are changed by men and that it is 
essential to educate the educator himself. This doctrine must, therefore, divide 
society into two parts, one of which is superior to society. 
The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or 
self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary 
praxis. (MECW, Vol. 5, p. 4, translation modified).7 
 
 
2.3 From the integral state to the possibility of integral autonomy 
Gramsci did not only offer an important contribution to the 
theory of the State and hegemony. He also attempted an answer to 
 
7 In the MECW revolutionäre Praxis is translated as revolutionary practice. I think that praxis is more 
accurate, especially since praxis is a crucial notion of Gramsci. It is also interesting that when 
Engels first included the “Theses on Feurebach” as an appendix to his Ludwig Feuerbach and the 
End of Classical German Phiosophy, he made certain modifications to the text of Marx’s original 
manuscript. One of these was to replace revolutionäre Praxis with umwälzende Praxis. Gramsci in 
his own translation of the ‘Theses’ seems to use Engels’s version and to follow a tradition that 
begins with Gentile and translates umwälzende Praxis as “rovesciamento della praxis” (Gramsci 
2007, p. 744. See also the note of the editors (Giuseppe Cospito and Gianni Francioni) on pp 
814-815). 
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the question to “how does the State think”, which is also a contri-
bution to any potential theory of organization. Of particular 
importance is Gramsci’s conception of the “integral state” (Thomas 
2009), which includes political society and civil society, public and 
private hegemonic apparatuses, the aspect of coercion, of direction 
/ leadership but also of consent.  
 
[T]he State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with 
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules (Gramsci 1975, 
Q15§10, p. 1765; SPN, p. 244). 
 
Gramsci’s reference to practical and theoretical activities is very 
important and it points towards a highly original relational and 
practical conception of the State. It points towards a thinking of the 
state neither as an instrument nor as a headquarters but as a terrain 
where the dominant classes produce discourses, ideologies, 
knowledges, strategies referring to their hegemonic practice. 
However, there are differences between how the state thinks and 
how the subaltern classes can think the possibility of their unity in 
the struggle for emancipation. It is exactly here that the question of 
organization emerges. The question is not whether the subaltern 
classes can influence, directly or indirectly, social and political 
relations of forces. Rather, the question is how to transform the 
subaltern classes into an autonomous social force in order for the 
question for a conquest of hegemony by the subaltern to be posed. 
In the following passage Gramsci not only establishes the terms of 
this challenge but also makes evident that the aim has to be 
organizational forms that enable their autonomous political 
constitution and mobilization: 
 
The subaltern classes, by definition, are not unified and cannot unite until 
they are able to become a “State”: their history, therefore, is intertwined with 
that of civil society, it is a “dismembered” and discontinuous function of the history of 
civil society [è una funzione «disgregata» e discontinua della storia della società 
civile] and thereby of the history of States and groups of States. Hence it is 
necessary to study: 1. the objective formation of the subaltern social groups, by 
the developments and transformations occurring in the sphere of economic 
production ; their quantitative diffusion and their origins in pre-existing social 
groups, whose mentality, ideology and aims they conserve for a time; 2. their 
active or passive affiliation to the dominant political formations, their attempts 
International Gramsci Journal No. 10 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2019  
 
 
24 
 
to influence the programmes of these formations in order to press claims of 
their own, and the consequences of these attempts in determining processes of 
decomposition, renovation or neo-formation; 3. the birth of new parties of the 
dominant groups, intended to conserve the assent of the subaltern groups and 
to maintain control over them; 4. The formations which the subaltern groups 
themselves produce, in order to press claims of a limited and partial character ; 
5. those new formations which assert the autonomy of the subaltern groups, 
but within the old framework ; 6. those formations which assert the integral 
autonomy, . . etc. (Gramsci 1975, Q25§5, p. 2288; SPN, p. 52. The italicized 
line, inadvertently omitted from SPN, is here reinstated with the consequent 
modification of a preposition that follows). 
 
According to this approach, on the one hand we have the integral 
state as the material terrain of bourgeois hegemony and on the other 
hand the exigency for organizational forms that could enhance the 
integral autonomy of the subaltern classes in their struggle for an 
antagonistic form of hegemony. However, one point is very import-
ant. This seemingly apparent symmetry between Stato integrale and 
autonomia integrale, should not be treated in a simplistic way. The State 
and the organizational forms that enable this integral autonomy of the 
subaltern classes are fundamentally different apparatuses. They re-
present antagonistic forms of organization and practice of politics. 
 
2.4. The emergence of a new intellectuality 
How can we think such an antagonistic form of political 
intellectuality? Gramsci offers some important points. First, he 
insisted that “everyone is a philosopher” (Gramsci 1975 Q11§12, p. 
1375; SPN, p. 323), thus pointing to the element of intellectuality 
inherent to any practice, as already discussed, but also the possibil-
ity of the emergence of mass forms of transformed intellectuality. 
Moreover, he stressed that the most important aspect refers to the 
transformation of the ways that people think when they think in a 
“coherent” way namely when they strive for their autonomy. 
 
For a mass of people to be led to think coherently and in the same coherent 
fashion about the real present world, is a “philosophical” event far more 
important and “original” than the discovery by some philosophical “genius” of 
a truth which remains the property of small groups of intellectuals. (Gramsci 
1975 Q11§12, p.1378; SPN, p. 325). 
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Gramsci insists that “[t]he political party for some social groups 
is nothing other than their specific way of elaborating their own 
category of organic intellectuals directly in the political and philo-
sophical field and not just in the field of productive technique” 
(Gramsci 1975 Q12§1, p. 1522; SPN, p. 15). However, he makes it 
clear that does not refer to some group or stratum of “specialists” 
but to all the militants. 
 
That all members of a political party should be regarded as intellectuals is an 
affirmation that can easily lend itself to mockery and caricature. But if one 
thinks about it nothing could be more exact. (Gramsci 1975, Q12§1, p. 1523; 
SPN, p. 16). 
 
In his struggling effort to think the mass formation of organic 
intellectuals for proletarian hegemony as integral subaltern 
autonomy, Gramsci insists that “[i]f the ‘new’ intellectuals put 
themselves forward as the direct continuation of the previous 
‘intelligentsia’, they are not new at all (that is, not tied to the new 
social group which organically represents the new historical 
situation) but are a conservative and fossilised left-over of the social 
group which has been historically superseded”(Gramsci 1975, 
Q11§16, p 1407; SPN, p. 453). These new intellectuals must be 
formed within the struggle of the working class for autonomy, but 
also within the practical effort for new forms of social organization 
and production. The fact that their formation is not limited to the 
traditional institutions associated with intellectual activity calls to 
mind Foucault’s conception of the “specific intellectuals” 
(Foucault, 2002: 126-133), although it should be noted that 
Gramsci stresses the direct connection with revolutionary political 
practice. This is evident in passages such as this: 
  
On this basis the weekly O[rdine] N[uovo] worked to develop certain forms 
of new intellectualism and to determine its new concepts, and this was not the 
least of the reasons for its success, since such a conception corresponded to 
latent aspirations and conformed to the development of the real forms of life. 
The mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, 
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in 
active participation in practical life, as constructor, organiser, “permanent 
persuader” and not just a simple orator (but superior at the same time to the 
abstract mathematical spirit); from technique-as-work one proceeds to 
technique-as-science and to the humanistic conception of history, without 
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which one remains “specialised” and does not become “directive” (specialised 
and political). (Gramsci 1975, Q12§3, p. 1551; SPN, pp. 9-10). 
 
Another important element pointing to the same direction, is to 
return to Gramsci’s conception of the philosophy of praxis as also a 
form of mass critical intellectuality and as a different practice of 
philosophy, There we can also find the figure of the “democratic 
philosopher” which also points to new way to think this antagon-
istic form of political intellectuality. 
 
One could say therefore that the historical personality of an individual 
philosopher is also given by the active relationship which exists between him 
and the cultural environment he is proposing to modify. The environment 
reacts back on the philosopher and imposes on him a continual process of self-
criticism. It is his “teacher”. This is why one of the most important demands 
that the modern intelligentsias have made in the political field has been that of 
the so-called “freedom of thought and of the expression of thought” 
(“freedom of the press”, “freedom of association”). For the relationship 
between master and disciple in the general sense referred to above is only 
realised where this political condition exists, and only then do we get the 
“historical” realization of a new type of philosopher, whom we could call a 
“democratic philosopher” in the sense that he is a philosopher convinced that 
his personality is not limited to himself as a physical individual but is an active 
social relationship of modification of the cultural environment. When the 
“thinker” is content with his own thought, when he is “subjectively”, that is 
abstractly, free, that is when he nowadays becomes a joke. The unity of science 
and life is precisely an active unity, in which alone liberty of thought can be 
realised; it is a master-pupil relationship, one between the philosopher and the 
cultural environment in which he has to work and from which he can draw the 
necessary problems for formulation and resolution. In other words, it is the 
relationship between philosophy and history. (Gramsci 1975, Q10II§44 pp. 
1331-32; SPN, p. 350). 
 
This conception of an active social relation of transformation of 
the cultural environment offers the starting point for a trans-
formative practice of political intellectuality that goes beyond the 
way suggested by Badiou. Here we are dealing with a process that 
included what people do in the struggle for emancipation, how they 
learn, think and change within struggle. This offers a much more 
dialectical image that combine doing politics and thinking politics, 
while at the same time being part of a movement that is 
transforming social relations and forms and this way producing the 
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intellectual elements and conditions that are necessary for such a 
movement. One might say that Gramsci had in mind not only a 
new quality of militancy but also a new form of mass intellectuality 
as a condition for hegemony.  
For Gramsci we can find here one of the main duties of 
intellectuals: ‘the task of the intellectuals is to determine and to 
organise moral and intellectual reform, in words to fit culture to the 
sphere of practice (Gramsci 1975, Q11§16, p. 1407; SPN, p. 253). 
In the first draft of this text in Notebook 8, instead of moral and 
intellectual reform Gramsci writes “cultural revolution” (Gramsci 
1975, Q8§171, p. 1044). As Fabio Frosini (Frosini 2003, p. 95-97) 
and Peter Thomas (Thomas 2009, pp. 232-234) have stressed the 
notion of the cultural revolution comes from the discussions of the 
NEP period and “Lenin’s last battle” (Lewin 1968), when in the 
thinking of Lenin there is a constant return of questions referring to 
the need for a new civilization and the new mass intellectuality as an 
answer to the contradictions of the transition process. 
  
2.5. The party as laboratory 
However, there are still open questions: how are these new mass 
forms of militant intellectuality going to be produced, especially 
when Gramsci was not simply suggesting copying the ways that the 
bourgeoisie formed its hegemonic apparatuses and articulated its 
hegemony? What form could the hegemonic apparatuses of a 
potential hegemony of the subaltern have? It is here that the 
conception of the political party as the terrain for new forms of 
mass political intellectualities emerges: 
 
One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern 
world, political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of conceptions of 
the world, because essentially what they do is to work out the ethics and the 
politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as it were as their historical 
“laboratory”. The parties recruit individuals out of the working mass, and the 
selection is made on practical and theoretical criteria at the same time. The 
relation between theory and practice becomes even closer the more the con-
ception is vitally and radically innovatory and opposed to old ways of thinking. 
For this reason one can say that the parties are the elaborators of new integral 
and all-encompassing intellectualities and the crucibles where the unification of 
theory and practice, understood as a real historical process, takes place 
(Gramsci 1975, Q11§12, p. 1385; SPN, p. 335 translation modified). 
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This is a very dense passage that offers a highly original 
conception of the political organization that at the same times 
offers both form and content to the question posed by Lukács 
when he referred to the question of organization as an intellectual 
question. The metaphor of the laboratory and the terrain of 
experimentation are radically different from the metaphors 
suggested for the party in the history of the working-class 
movement. In particular, it is important to stress that they do not 
point to imitating the State and its apparatuses. Gramsci presents 
the party as neither imperium in imperio nor as the general staff of the 
proletarian army. In contrast, he points towards the unification of 
theory and practice, proposing a political process for the product-
ion of knowledges, strategies, tactics, and forms of intellectuality, 
where the elements that come from the participation in struggles 
(experience, sensitivities, encounters with other forms of know-
ledge and discourse, theories, collective experiments) can be 
elaborated and transformed. It is this functioning of the party as a 
laboratory of intellectuality that enables it to contribute to the 
formation of a new historical bloc. It is only through such a process 
that the particular version of representation and transformation 
associated with a politics for communism. 
 
If the relationship between intellectuals and people-nation, between the 
leaders and the led, the rulers and the ruled, is provided by an organic cohesion 
in which feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge (not 
mechanically but in a way that is alive), then and only then is the relationship 
one of representation. Only then can there take place an exchange of individual 
elements between the rulers and ruled, leaders [dirigenti] and led, and can the 
shared life be realised which alone is a social force with the creation of the 
“historical bloc” (Gramsci 1975, Q11§67 pp. 1505-6; SPN, p. 418).  
 
There are certain conditions for such a conception of the 
political party. It is important to stress the distance between 
Gramsci and a bureaucratic conception of centralization and his 
opposition to the Stalinist version of the “party spirit”. The 
following passage from Q9§68, written between July and August 
1932 (and then included in Q13§36) refers exactly to this point: 
 
The most accurate name would be bureaucratic centralism. “Organicity” 
can only be found in democratic centralism, which is so to speak a 
“centralism” in movement –i.e. a continual adaptation of the organization to 
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the real movement, and is organic to the extent that it takes account of 
movement which is the organic way that historical reality manifests itself 
(Gramsci 1975, Q9§68, p. 1139; cf. the second draft in SPN, pp. 188-9). 
 
Giuseppe Cospito (2016, pp. 169-184) has shown, by means of a 
very detailed presentation of all the relevant passages from the 
Notebooks, the displacements in the way that Gramsci deals with 
bureaucratic, organic and democratic centralism. Initially Gramsci 
opposes democratic centralism, which is presented as his own 
choice, to both bureaucratic centralism (in essence the Stalinist 
version of centralism) and organic centralism (which refers to 
Bordiga’s conception of the party) thinking that they have similar 
problematic aspects. However, at a later stage, expressed in pass-
ages such as the one quoted above, the main enemy is bureaucratic 
centralism, namely the Stalinist conception of the party and demo-
cratic centralism is presents as the one that can also have the 
necessary organic character. This implies that the democratic 
functioning of the political organization is not only the guarantee to 
avoid bureaucracy, but also the necessary condition to achieve an 
“organic” character, namely close connection to the working class 
and to the potential emergence in a concrete historical conjuncture. 
Moreover, “organic” is an adjective that we often encounter in the 
Notebooks and it always refers to close relation, historical depth, and 
real adequation between politics and historical dynamics. 
It is in this sense that for Gramsci one of the gravest dangers 
that a party faces is to become an anachronism. And although the 
following passage comes from a note referring to the broader issue 
of the role of political parties in a period of organic crisis, it is 
interesting how it can also refer to the political organizations of the 
working class: 
 
This order of phenomena is connected to one of the most important 
questions concerning the political party – i.e. the party’s capacity to react 
against force of habit, against the tendency to become mummified and 
anachronistic. Parties come into existence, and constitute themselves as 
organisations, in order to influence the situation at moments which are 
historically vital for their class; but they are not always capable of adapting 
themselves to new tasks and to new epochs, nor of evolving pari passu with the 
overall relations of force (and hence the relative position of their class) in the 
country in question, or in the international field. In analysing the development 
of parties, it is necessary to distinguish: their social group; their mass member-
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ship; their bureaucracy and General Staff. The bureaucracy is the most 
dangerously hidebound and conservative force; if it ends up by constituting a 
compact body, which stands on its own and feels itself independent of the 
mass of members, the party ends up by becoming anachronist and at moments 
of acute crisis it is voided of its social content and left as though suspended in 
mid-air. (Gramsci 1975, Q13§23, p. 1604; SPN, p. 211). 
 
Gramsci’s distancing from Stalinist practices in regard to the 
internal fighting inside the party was evident in various moments. 
In the famous letter of 1926 on behalf of the Italian Party, in which 
they asked the leadership of the Soviet Party to not jeopardize the 
unity of the international communist movement, in his refusal 
inside the prison to endorse the denunciations of the “Opposition”, 
despite his criticism of Trotsky and Bukharin, his critique of 
“statolatry” (Gramsci 1975, Q8§130, pp. 1020-21; PN Vol. 3, pp. 
310-11), but also his dense critique of the evolution of the Stalinism 
in notes 74 and 76 of Notebook 14 (SPN pp. 254-7), written in 
March 1935 (notes that at the same time offer an insightful analysis 
of fascism).8 
In contrast, Gramsci’s conception of democratic centralism 
points towards a conception of the party as an open political and 
intellectual process, constantly adapting itself to the surrounding 
social environment and the dynamics of the conjuncture. It is very 
important that Gramsci insists that this process is experimental in 
nature, it is an experimental practice. The very notion of the 
experiment expands the notion of the laboratory towards an 
experimental conception of politics. The following passage from 
Q9§68 exemplifies this position: 
 
In parties representing socially subaltern groups, the element of stability 
represents the organic need to ensure that hegemony does not belong to 
privileged groups, but to the progressive forces, those organically progressive 
with respect to other forces that are allied but composed of and oscillating 
between the old and the new. In any event, what is important to note is that in 
the manifestations of bureaucratic centralism the situation evolves due to the 
lack of initiative; that is, due to the political primitiveness of the peripheral 
forces, even when these are homogeneous with the hegemonic territorial 
group. Especially with international territorial organisms, the emergence of 
such situations is extremely harmful and dangerous. Democratic centralism is 
an elastic formula that lends itself to many ‘incarnations’; it exists because it is 
 
8 See the reading of these passages in Cospito 2016. 
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continually interpreted and continually adapted to necessity, and it consists in 
the critical search for that which is equal in the apparent dissimilarity and 
distinct and opposite in the apparent uniformity, and in organizing and closely 
connecting that which is similar, but in a way that this organization and 
connection should appear as an ‘inductive’, experimental practical necessity 
and not the result of a rationalistic, deductive, abstract procedure that is, 
produced by ‘pure’ intellectuals. This continual effort to distinguish between 
the ‘international’ and ‘unitary’ in the national and local reality represents, in 
reality, the concrete political operation, the merely productive activity of 
historical progress. This effort requires an organic unity between theory and 
practice, between intellectual strata and the masses, between governors and 
governed. The formulae of unity and federation lose much of their meaning 
from this point of view; they instead produce their poison in the ‘bureaucratic’ 
conception, according to which in reality unity does not exist, only superficially 
calm and ‘mute’ stagnant swamps; neither does federation exist, only sacks of 
potatoes; that is, the mechanical juxtaposition of individual ‘units’ without any 
interrelationship (Gramsci 1975, Q9§68, pp. 1139-40).9 
 
3. The question of organization today 
I think that in Gramsci we can find a much more dialectical 
approach to the question posed by Lazarus and Badiou regarding a 
form of thinking of politics in interiority to a potentially revolution-
ary sequence but also with an answer to the questions posed by 
Lukács. If we are talking about organizations that refer to a 
communist horizon, the question is much broader than simply 
avoiding bureaucratic sclerosis. Such organizations must also be a 
permanent learning process, production sites of thinking. This is 
suggested by the analogy to the laboratory. This points towards 
spaces where people coming from the movements come in order 
not only to be politicized, something that in the tradition of the 
Left was considered as synonymous with ideological indoctrination, 
but to contribute with their own voice, but also in their own voice, 
and experience to the complex process of elaboration of altern-
atives, while at the same time constantly struggling against the dis-
aggregating effects of bourgeois ideology and politics. It also points 
towards the formation of antagonistic forms of theory and 
knowledge production, beyond and outside traditional academic 
frameworks, an approach that can be found in the history of the 
labour movement from Marx’s enquête ouvrière to the idea of co-
research in workerism / operaismo (Lanzardo 1965; Alquati 1975; 
 
9 We use the translation of this passage in Cospito 2016, pp. 77-78. 
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Alquati 1993; Panzieri 1976; Wright 2002), to other experiments 
with alternative forms and practices of knowledge production. The 
analogy with the laboratory also includes an experimental approach, 
which is exactly the “gnoseological” aspect of any politics of 
transformation, since it points towards learning by struggles but 
also from the collective experimentation and ingenuity of the 
subaltern. 
Such a conception of the organization, the party or the front as a 
laboratory and open learning process, enables us to think the 
hegemonic aspect of politics along with the element of encounter 
and articulation of movements, demands and political strategies 
beyond the limits of any claim to horizontality, a notion that cannot 
account for the element of transformation and potential 
unifications of resistances into a common hegemonic project, a 
path of collective experimentation towards communism. At the 
same time, it avoids the logic of imposing an imaginary unity or an 
almost metaphysical conception of the ‘political line, insisting on 
the open and necessarily but also creatively contradictory and 
transformative character of the process. Alan Sears has recently 
stressed this aspect:  
 
A truly effective anti-capitalism requires a deep commitment to learning 
from every situation which requires both open-endedness and fundamental 
orientating principles. The resources of anti-capitalism cannot consist of the 
shards of the last infrastructure of dissent preserved as holy relics and passed 
on as “truth”. The current marginal anti-capitalist left is too often grounded in 
a faith-based politics, founded on a worshipful approach to the experience of 
twentieth-century socialism or anarchism. The next new left needs to work cre-
atively and open-endedly together to identify emergent trends and develop new 
politics that fits the times and is informed by past struggles (Sears 2014, p. 111). 
 
This need to restore the voice to the masses as part of the attempt 
towards a refoundation of the politics of emancipation was also 
stressed by Althusser in the 1970s. In one of his confrontations 
with the open crisis of the French Communist Party, which was not 
only strategic but also had to do with the prevailing organizational 
culture, Althusser insisted upon the importance of 
 
restoring their voice to the masses who make history. Not just putting oneself ‘at 
the service of the masses’ (a slogan which may be pretty reactionary), but open-
ing one’s ears to them, studying and understanding their aspirations and their con-
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tradictions, their aspirations in their contradictions, learning how to be attent-
ive to the masses’ imagination and inventiveness.(Althusser 1977, p. 11). 
 
This call by Althusser, which was part of his broader self-critical 
acknowledgement of the crisis of the communist movement, can of 
course be linked to Badiou’s insistence that people think that we 
have already discussed, they think in their aspirations and contra-
dictions and their imagination and inventiveness. Yet this requires 
the terrain for this voice and this thinking to be heard. It is here 
that Gramsci’s “Modern Prince” enters the stage and sets the terms 
of the debate. The party as laboratory represents this possibility.  
This also gives a new meaning to the need for new forms of 
democracy and participation, new democratic forms of militancy. It 
is at the same time an attempt to create political spaces the offer a 
better “sociality” than the everyday confrontation with rigid hier-
archies, exploitation, oppression and sexism and an attempt to 
enable this collective “restoring the voice”, this opening to the 
lessons coming from the struggles and the movements and the 
experiments with alternative social configurations, along with new 
forms of radical theory and new forms of militant research.  
I think that all these questions are today more pertinent than 
ever.10 The varieties of radicalism emerging after 2011 have con-
fronted the question of organization in different and contradictory 
ways. The new forms of democracy and equal voicing in sometimes 
led to an underestimation of the question of organization of a new 
type, a question lost in the debates regarding horizontality and 
intersectionality. Traditional forms of “Leninist” organizing, at least 
in Western Europe and the US also went through a period of crisis, 
since the mentality of the “small group” cannot stand up to the 
challenge offered by mass movements of a different magnitude. 
Broad Fronts, especially those organized by means of forms of 
mass digital participation also showed their limits not only in 
strategic political terms (in the sense of an inability to work towards 
the formation of a new historical bloc) but also in the absence of 
any actual interaction between leadership and base. Putting aside 
the question of organization, as in a certain manner Badiou has 
 
10 On the importance of Gramsci’s consideration for the organization question today see also 
Thomas 2013. 
International Gramsci Journal No. 10 (2nd Series /Seconda Serie) Summer /Estate 2019  
 
 
34 
 
suggested, in the name of the danger of all “party politics” turning 
into parliamentary “State politics”, is not an answer.  
In the sense exactly as the integral State was defined by Gramsci 
as the “entire complex of practical and theoretical activities” 
(Gramsci 1975, Q15§10 p. 1765, SPN p. 244) that ensure the 
hegemony of the bourgeoisie, the Modern Prince can only be 
understood as the entire complex of the theoretical and practical 
activities that emerge out of the subaltern classes in their struggle 
for integral autonomy and hegemony. It is on the basis of this 
analogy that we can say that today the Modern Prince can only take 
the form of an integral united front. 
Consequently, the question does not simply refer to the 
democratic character of organizations and fronts. In the same way 
that the integral state represents the unity of political society and 
civil society, in all their complexity and contradictory character, the 
integral united front represents the contradictory and tendential 
unity of political organizations and movements (against exploitation 
and precariousness, oppression, racism, neo-colonialism, patriarchy 
and heteronormativity). It is the reason that we cannot think of the 
party as an apparatus, even a complex one. We are referring to 
plurality of processes, practices, resistances and collectivities. Their 
potential unification requires thinking the party or the organization 
as a laboratory producing intellectualities, strategies, tactics, but also 
as a hegemonic practice. It is a constant encounter between practices, 
experiences and knowledges.  
“Building the party” today – which in the contemporary histori-
cal period of fragmentation of the forces, militants and experiences 
that oppose capitalism, points towards the creation of united fronts 
rather than single parties – means transforming the terrain, forming 
networks, spaces and new public spheres along with new militant 
practices and a renewed conception of political discipline in a com-
munist horizon above and beyond any ritualistic and mechanistic 
conception of political discipline. Moreover, this should be com-
bined with new and original forms of struggle, of resistance, block-
age, reappropriation and emancipation. In this sense it is not about 
a simple recruiting campaign but about a “permanent constituent 
process”, combined with the autonomy of the forms of self-organ-
ization and counter-power of the subaltern. The very fact that today 
the terrain of rethinking the very notion of the Modern Prince in-
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cludes parties, organizations, movements, and networks points to 
the uneven and complex charecter of the process but at the same 
time offers a way to actually think the potential of such a process. 
In this sense, we can return to the comparison that Negri makes 
and for whom the party should be a factory of strategies and an 
enterprise of subversion. Taking into consideration the changes that 
have taken places in the very form of the factory and the fact that 
capitalist production today is organized in a much more fluid way, 
more dispersed, more fragmented, at the same time that new, orig-
inal and more complex forms of coordination are used, we can say 
that also the form of the party and the front need to change, while 
remaining loyal to their essential role: to produce strategies and 
subversive practices, to form a terrain in order for the movements 
that are at the heart of social antagonism to be transformed in all 
their multiplicity to hegemonic projects for communism. This also 
entails rethinking the forms of international coordination and a new 
international, in order to go beyond the quest for an “international 
revolutionary centre”, in order for an international public sphere to 
emerge, based upon a new anti-imperialism, in order to rethink and 
elaborate new strategies based upon local experiments. The entire 
history of the revolutionary tendencies of the working class 
movements is also the history of international debates, with the 
most fruitful of them being those where the emphasis was upon 
treating local experiences as experimental sites instead of looking 
for the “fidelity” to the line of some revolutionary centre. 
Rethinking critically and in a practical manner the question of 
organization today means rethinking the possibility of a democratic 
laboratory for new forms of collective militant intellectuality, for 
the production of organic intellectuals of a new type and militant 
“democratic philosophers”, in order to put in practice the idea that 
“all members are intellectuals” and “everyone is a democratic 
philosopher”. 
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